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Hegelian Background of Brandom’s account of logic
Since the rise of analytic philosophy at the beginning of 20th century, its relation to Hegel’s heredity 
has been predominantly critical1. Both the founding fathers of linguistic analysis, Russell and Moore, 
overtly opposed Hegel (more precisely, British neo-hegelianism) in their attempts to clear philosophi-
cal language from conceptual muddle and logical confusions. And most of later analytic philosophers, 
despite all the differences between their particular views, generally continued along the lines set by 
Moore and Russell – in the way that they tried to distance themselves both from Hegel’s ideas and 
from his mere style of philosophizing. However, some prominent thinkers adopted the stances oppo-
site the main, neo-positivist current in philosophical analysis and compellingly showed the insuffici-
ency of analytical apparatus in explaining the philosophical problems of meaning and understanding. 
Thus, Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations stresses the necessity of resorting to 
the practice of »using« language and to the concept of »forms of life«, William van Orman Quine in 
Two Dogmas of Empiricism defended a holistic view of meaning, while Donald Davidson, in his va-
rious papers, subscribed to the coherence theory of truth and knowledge.2 The most significant work 
in this context, however, is, above all, the seminal essay by Wilfrid Sellars Empiricism and the Philo-
sophy of Mind, in which Sellars explicitly declared to be inspired by Hegel’s critique of »immediacy« 
and to attack, from that point of view, the »classical« (mainly Russellian) »sense data theories«.3 Alt-
hough only few of such philosophers were directly influenced by the author of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, the tendencies mentioned above allowed Hegelian ideas to gradually enter analytic philosophy 
and, consequently, led to what Paul Redding calls »the return of Hegelian thought«.4
 In discussing the »Hegelian turn« or »the return of Hegelian thought« within contemporary 
analytic philosophy, Redding appeals mostly to such philosophers as Wilfrid Sellars, Gereth Evans, 
John McDowell and Robert B. Brandom. Yet, it should be conceded that this turn gained its most 
developed, thorough and systematic form in the work of Brandom. It also ought to be granted that 
the principal work of Brandom’s analytic rethinking of Hegel still remains his Making It Explicit5 
(1994), which sets out at length the inferential conception of meaning, understanding and communi-
cation. But although Brandom repeatedly declared himself to be under Hegel’s pervasive influence, 
in Making It Explicit he decided not to elaborate in great detail on strictly historical questions; in-
stead, he put forward a comprehensive and systematic semantic theory held in a Hegelian »spirit«. 
1 Cf. Peter Hylton, »Hegel and Analytic Philosophy«, in: The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, ed. F. C. 
Beiser, Cambridge 1993, 445–485.
2 Cf. Donald Davidson, »A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge«, in: Truth and Interpretation: 
Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. E. Lepore, Oxford 1986, 307–319; »On the Very 
Idea of Conceptual Scheme«, in: Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984, 183–198.
3 Wilfrid Sellars, »Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind«, in: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of 
Science, vol. I, eds. H. Feigl, M. Scriven, Minneapolis, MN, 1956, 253.
4 Paul Redding, Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought, Cambridge, MA, 2007.
5 Robert B. Brandom, Making It Explicit, Cambridge, MA, 1994.
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Indeed, he did also publish several important articles on particular problems in Hegel (some of them 
are included in Tales of the Mighty Dead6 and Reason in Philosophy7), but his project of writing a 
book devoted distinctly to the author of the Phenomenology of Spirit is still awaiting its accom-
plishment. The aim of this paper is to indicate some typically Hegelian themes in their linkage with 
Brandom’s overall theoretical enterprise. A particular stress will be put on the specific understanding 
of logic by Brandom and on showing its Hegelian sources.
 In Articulating Reasons Brandom declared that one of the chief aims of his philosophical inqui-
ries was »to introduce […] a way of thinking about semantics that is different from more familiar 
ones, and on that basis also a new way of thinking about logic«8. The difference he has in mind con-
cerns mainly two things: first, his understanding what logic is, and, second, the question of the status 
of formal logic as well as its role in human reasoning. In fulfilling both of these tasks, he develops 
an account that is close to the ideas of Hegel. As to the first aspect, for Brandom logic is not a set of 
abstract rules and procedures that can be formally demonstrated and that determine – from outside 
– the standards of human rational thinking; rather, logic is something that constitutes the process of 
determining and developing conceptual content. It is more basic than traditional formal account in 
the sense that Brandomian logic does not have to depend on abstract forms. Ultimately, the latter 
can be just generated on the basis of the former. As to the second aspect, Brandom places logical 
vocabulary and thus formal rules in the context of human discursive and normative practice. Logical 
patterns are not a priori givens. Their status is not abstract and independent of this practice. They 
emerge from human linguistic activity and are rooted only in it. In his depiction of the discursive 
game of giving and asking for reasons, Brandom shows how the logical (i. e. formal) emerges from 
the non-logical (i. e. non-formal), from our mere mongering of concepts. As a proponent of such a 
view, he puts himself in opposition to most of analytic tradition. Instead, he comes back to Hegel. In 
what follows, the crucial Hegelian motifs in Brandom will be pointed out and described.
 The central Hegelian theme to be shown, the one that is constitutive of Brandom’s semantic pro-
ject, seems to be taken directly from Hegel’s philosophy of right: this is the notion of recognition. 
In the interpretation of the author of Making It Explicit, recognition has its application not only in 
the legal or political sphere, but also underlies basic epistemological and practical human activity. 
Accordingly, it constitutes the source of normativity in our using and forming of concepts. The mere 
concept of recognition also implies that normativity is closely connected with intersubjectivity – due 
to the fact that it is impossible for me to address the act of recognition to myself9; on the contrary, 
I always strive for acknowledgment from others and possibly grant my recognition to those who 
try to obtain it from me. According to Brandom, a very similar pragmatic process takes place in 
our linguistic practice. The interaction between participants in discourse relies on undertaking and 
ascribing two sorts of deontic statuses: commitment and entitlement, which would correspond re-
spectively to the act of demanding of recognition and to the act of giving it to someone. One person, 
by saying something, commits oneself to what they said and thus entitles other speaker to vindicate 
their commitment. In doing so, they seek to achieve entitlement to their statement from others. What 
exactly am I – as a discourse participant – committed to when saying something? This depends on 
the speech act I make, but paradigmatically the situation looks as follows:10 I advance an assertion 
and, by doing this, commit myself to justify it when challenged. In other words, I become obliged 
to give reasons when asked for them, and to show the inference from these reasons to the asserted 
conclusion. At the same time, my interlocutor ascribes to me such a commitment, and if the reasons 
  6 Brandom, Tales of the Mighty Dead, Cambridge, MA 2002.
  7 Brandom, Reason in Philosophy, Cambridge, MA2009.
  8 Brandom, Articulating Reasons, Cambridge, MA 2001, 45.
  9 Cf. Brandom, Reason in Philosophy, chapter II: »Autonomy, Community and Freedom«, 52–77.
10 Cf. Brandom, Making It Explicit, chapter III.
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I gave as a justification are acceptable, then they also ascribe to me an entitlement to the advanced 
assertion. As we go along, I make other assertions to which I am also committed and possibly en-
titled by others. In case I hold two incompatible beliefs/assertions – i. e. when my commitment to 
one statement precludes my entitlement to another one11 – the interlocutors may indicate the discer-
ned incompatibility and withdraw their entitlement to one of my commitments. Then, I am obliged 
to revise my beliefs and my justifications in order to make them possibly consistent. The discourse 
participants continuously keep score on me: on my commitments, entitlements and on appearing 
incompatibilities. Their attitudes towards me inform me, in a way, about the moves I should further 
make in a linguistic game. In turn, on my part, I also keep score on others, I grant my entitlements to 
other speakers, challenge some commitments, and indicate their incompatibilities. We all take part 
in the inferential game of giving and asking for reasons, which is also the game of mutual scorekee-
ping. Such a practice is a dynamic one. It does not lead to fixing any static and conclusive system of 
beliefs. Our commitments, entitlements can change and evolve during the discourse. Similarly, our 
concepts and their meaning can be developed and changed as we go along.
 Although there is a great number of speech genres, different speech acts or language games, 
the essence of language and, thus, of all discursive practice is making assertions and inferences. 
Actually, both of them are interrelated: on the one hand, inference depends on assertion, since only 
assertion can serve equally as premises and conclusion in inferences; on the other hand, assertion has 
both its meaning and pragmatic force only when used in the practice of inferring. Asserting and in-
ferring constitute the essence of language in the sense that every other speech act or language game 
depends on it, e. g.: asking questions is understandable only against the background of assertions 
that could be a possible answer for it, giving an order is conceivable only against the background 
of possible assertions describing the state of affairs after fulfilment of this order, etc. According to 
inferentialism, the practice sketched above lies at the core of semantic contentfulness. Indeed, it is 
an indispensable basis for the appearance any meaningful content.12
 Against the backdrop of mutual recognition between speakers, however, the question of sound-
ness or validity of performed inferences arises. After closer examination of the game of giving and 
asking for reasons, it will turn out that the validity of these inferences is not based on any formal pat-
terns. At the point of departure, what the participants in discourse have is not formal logic, but only 
their dispositions to take some deontic attitude to others, i. e. to ascribe (and to refuse or withdraw) 
commitments and entitlements. Therefore, there are no logical givens to be discovered, and there are 
no other institutions or judges to decide from outside – from an external, extra-discursive point of 
view – which inference is good and which one is not. The ones who make the inferences sound are 
the scorekeeping speakers themselves. 
 This epistemic situation also corresponds well to some of Hegel’s ideas from the Philosophy of 
Right, where he claims that what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational.13 In Hegel, this re-
ferred principally to the political sphere and meant that »social institutions aspire and tend to achieve 
a fundamentally rational form«,14 that their rationality progressively actualizes itself. The same can 
be referred to the epistemic level of Brandom’s conception, in which our actual discursive practice 
gradually develops its immanent rationality despite the fact that not every actual justification is 
acceptable and correct as it stands. Rationality, both in Hegel and in Brandom, manifests itself not 
only in the faculty of deducing and analyzing, but primarily in the ability to constitute and legislate 
principles. These principles can be revised and changed during human, discursive interaction. Here, 
11 Cf. ibidem, 169.
12 Ibidem, 167–168. 
13 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. S. W. Dyde, Kitchener 2001, »Author’s Preface«, 10–20.
14 Kenneth Westphal, »The Basic Context and Structure of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right«, in The Cam-
bridge Companion to Hegel, 234.
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it should be underlined that the rational constitution of rules and principles is not a matter of only 
individual intellectual activity, but is a fundamentally social matter. On the one hand, individuals 
depend on society and acquire their conceptual resources and inferential abilities only in a social 
context. On the other hand, they participate, at the same time, in social practices and either perpetu-
ate or try to modify them according to their own needs and their conception of life, action etc. They 
collectively form social reality. As a consequence, there is a mutual influence between the social and 
the individual. Brandom’s scorekeeping game expresses just this idea.
 As to Brandom’s description of inferential, linguistic practice, the question »How is inferring pos-
sible at all, if there are no external criteria of correctness?« arises. The answer would be as follows. 
During the discourse, the participants pay close attention not to the form, but rather to the content: 
they infer not formally, but materially. They proceed, for example, from »That is red« to »That is not 
blue« or from »That is red« to »That is coloured« etc., without basically complying with the laws of 
logic. And the very possibility of carrying material inferences, especially of the former type (from 
»That is red« to »That is not blue«), is closely connected to the next Hegelian notion, namely the prin-
ciple of determinate negation – which Brandom associates with his concept of »incompatibility«15, or 
»material incompatibility«,16 and which plays a central role in his whole account.
 The concept of determinate negation is another, distinct Hegelian motif that underlies Brandom’s 
inferentialist project. According to Hegel, for any property and for any conceptual content to be spe-
cified – to have a determinate meaning – this property or concept has to occur in opposition to some 
other properties or concepts. »For they are only determinate« – as Hegel puts it in the Phenomenology 
of Spirit – »in so far as they differentiate themselves from one another, and relate themselves to others 
as opposed«;17 and some pages later he gives a vivid example of this, saying that: »white is white 
only in opposition to black, and so on«.18 In just this sense, it is possible to say, as Hegel does, that all 
determination is negation. In Brandom’s view, the principle of determinate negation weighs in favour 
of the inferential conception of meaning, in which any propositionally specified content stands in the 
relation of incompatibility with another propositional meaning. It therefore leads to two conclusions 
that speak for Brandomian inferentialism: first, that we can always make an inference from one sen-
tence to another that is incompatible with it; and, second, that the meaning of the first sentence is partly 
determined by the meaning of the second – by means of the inferential relation of incompatibility.
 As to the second type of above-mentioned inferences, i. e. the transition from »That is red« to 
»That is coloured«, the very possibility of this can be based on Hegel’s holism, which is, ultimately, 
also connected with the principle of determinate negation.19 According to Hegel, concepts gain their 
determinateness only within a comprehensive, holistic system; they can become definite only on ac-
count of their relations to other conceptual content.20 Although the most fundamental relation is the 
one of material incompatibility (the counterpart of Hegel’s »determinate negation«), in Brandom’s 
reading, there is necessarily another relation, namely that of material consequence (the counterpart 
of Hegel’s notion of »mediation«). The inference from »That is red« to »That is coloured« is an 
example of just the latter one. And this is based on material incompatibility in the sense that it can 
be reformulated only in terms of incompatibility in the following way: everything that is incompa-
tible with »That is coloured« is also incompatible with »That is red«.21 In this way, in Brandom’s 
15 Brandom, Making It Explicit, 189–190.
16 Brandom, »Holism and Idealism in Hegel’s Phenomenology«, in: Tales of the Mighty Dead, 180–181.
17 Georg W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford 1977, 69
18 Ibidem, 72.
19 For a closer discussion of it, see Brandom, »Holism and Idealism in Hegel’s Phenomenology«, 182–186 
et passim.
20 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §§ 161, 162.
21 Cf. Brandom, »Holism and Idealism in Hegel’s Phenomenology«, 180.
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interpretation, both Hegel’s »mediation« and »determinate negation« are interrelated, and – using 
the inferentialist terminology – all material consequence relations can be technically expressed by 
material incompatibility ones. As a result, both of them constitute semantic holism, which may be 
recognized as a next main Hegelian anchorage in the conception laid out in Making It Explicit.
 The characteristic feature of Brandom’s inferentialism is that his semantic holism is closely tied 
with semantic propositionalism. Propositionalism says that the basic semantic unit is not a subsenten-
tial term, but a whole declarative sentence understood as a proposition. The meaning of subsentential 
terms, predications etc., is not autonomous, but is derived from the meaning of the whole sentence; it 
depends on the role it plays in the entire sentential unit. But what, in turn, constitutes the meaning of 
the proposition? In such a holistic view, the meaning of one sentence is determined through the infe-
rential relations to other sentences. In this way, the inference, a claim and reasons for it, constitutes 
the context in which propositions, judgments, or assertions achieve their significance. This feature 
also corresponds to Hegelian considerations on the nature of judgment and syllogism included in 
the Science of Logic (Book III), namely, that the syllogism has to be regarded as the »truth« of the 
judgment, not as something that consists of judgments.22 Such a claim can be legitimately named the 
»context principle«,23 according to which terms gain their significance in the context of the judgment, 
and judgments also get their meaning in the context of the inference. Although some formulations of 
the context principle can be also found in other philosophers (mainly in Kant, but also in Frege and 
later Wittgenstein), its most explicit version is embedded in Hegel. Thus, this can be agreed to be the 
next, distinct Hegelian motif adopted by Brandom. On that basis, we can ascribe both to Brandom and 
to Hegel three interrelated stances: inferentialism, propositionalism and holism.
 In Brandom’s view, inference is a sort of practice exercised by language practitioners who as-
cribe to themselves deontic statuses of commitment and entitlement. There are three types of such 
inferences:24 1) commitment-preserving inferences: if one is committed to p, one is also committed to 
q (e. g. if I am committed to »That is red«, then I am committed to »That is coloured«); 2) entitlement-
preserving inferences: if one is entitled to p, then one is conditionally entitled to q (e. g. if I am entitled 
to »The match is dry« then I am provisionally entitled to »The match will light if struck«); 3) incom-
patibilities: two claims are materially incompatible in case »commitment to one precludes entitlement 
to the other«25 (e. g. if I am committed to »That is red« then I am not entitled to »That is blue«). What 
is typical of these kinds of inferences is that they are materially correct or incorrect: they are correct 
or incorrect on account of their content and non-logical vocabulary, not of their logical form.
 It is worth emphasizing here the crucial shifting of stress from form to content in Brandom’s 
account. For here those accustomed to the prevailing view on logic could disagree with Brandom, 
claiming that, in fact, every good inference is a logical inference, since even material inferences can 
be treated as enthymematic. Enthymematic inference is not formally valid as it stands, when only 
explicit premises are taken into account; yet, when implicit, hidden premises are also considered, the 
whole reasoning turns out to be valid. Accordingly, a formalist philosopher would say that the above 
inference: from »That is red« to »That is coloured« has an additional, hidden premise »If that is red, 
then that is coloured«, and, as a result, it has a logical form of modus ponens: [p U (p 1 q)] 1 q.But 
even so, the question is which of the two options (either material or formal one) is more fundamental. 
Brandom chooses the former approach: »We need not treat – he writes – all correct inferences as cor-
rect in virtue of their form, supplying implicit or suppressed premises involving logical vocabulary 
as needed. Instead, we can treat inferences such as the inference from ›Pittsburgh is to the west of 
Philadelphia‹ to ›Philadelphia is to the east of Pittsburgh‹, or from ›It is raining‹ to ›The streets will be 
22 Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford 1977, 669.
23 Redding, Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought, 114.
24 Cf. Brandom, Making It Explicit, 168–169.
25 Ibidem, 169.
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wet‹, as materially good inferences – that is, inferences that are good because of the content of their 
non-logical vocabulary«.26
 A good reason for Brandom’s giving primacy to the material, rather than to the formal, is that the 
notion of formal validity – or the mere concept of logical form – can be defined in terms of material 
correctness, while the converse route of explanation is not possible. Namely, according to Brandom, 
formally valid inferences may be understood as: firstly, inferences which are materially correct, and, 
secondly, which cannot be turned into materially bad ones by substituting non-privileged for non-
privileged vocabulary in their premises and conclusions27. In this definition, by non-privileged vo-
cabulary Brandom means simply non-logical vocabulary, whereas privileged vocabulary is the one 
that constitutes logical form – i. e. that proves to be invariant under any substitution. In this way, 
logical vocabulary, and thus logical form, is a derivative of material inferences and as such cannot be 
thought of as independent and fundamental for our thinking. For Brandom, logical vocabulary serves 
as a means of elucidating implicit inferential commitments, of expressing the content of our concepts 
and as a tool that helps to express our material reasoning in an explicit, logically valid structure.
 Brandom sees it as follows: »In applying the concept lion to Leo, I implicitly commit myself 
to the applicability of the concept mammal to him. If my language is expressively rich enough to 
contain conditionals, I can say that if Leo is a lion, then Leo is a mammal. (And if the language is 
expressively rich enough to include quantificational operators, I can say that if anything is a lion, 
then it is a mammal.) That Cleo is a cephalopod is good (indeed, decisive) evidence that she is not 
a lion. If my language is expressively rich enough to contain negation, I can make that implicit 
inferential component articulating the content of the concept lion explicit by saying that if Cleo is a 
cephalopod, then Cleo is not a mammal«28. Accordingly, in this view, conditionals codify inferences 
as claims, transfer our commitments into a form of assertions and present them in a clause »p→q«. 
The basic task of negation is to codify incompatible commitments. Consequently, every concept that 
is materially incompatible with another one can be articulated with negation and preceded, in formal 
notation, by the symbol »~p«.29 Both of them serve to express conceptual content in an explicit way.
 The above discussion shows that Hegelian the inspirations in Brandom’s philosophical work, 
especially in his considerations concerning logic, are deep and widespread, though not always direct 
and literal. Both philosophers develop a philosophy of logic rather than logic in a strict, formal sen-
se; they show the social, discursive basis for various types of logical inferences. For both of them, 
logic is not simply the abstract forms, but, rather, it is a practice of reasoning, of exchanging rea-
sons, that generates these forms. And in this sense, it does not entirely depend on formal rules. The 
proper, fundamental logic is a process of determining conceptual content, and this process is deeply 
embedded in human, social, discursive activity. Both Hegel and Brandom explore the same general 
line of thinking about logic, but they do it using different conceptual apparatuses and from different 
philosophical and historical perspectives.
Tomasz Zarębski, PhD
University of Lower Silesia
53-611 Wrocław
Poland
tomasz.zarebski@dsw.edu.pl
26 Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 85.
27 Ibidem, 55.
28 Ibidem, 19–20.
29 Ibidem, 147.
